Principal Investigator:
Edward A. Wasserman
Stuit Professor of Experimental Psychology
University of Iowa

Co-Investigator:
James E. King
Professor Emeritus
University of Arizona

Co-Investigator:
Duane M. Rumbaugh
Professor Emeritus
Georgia State University

Co-Investigator:
E. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh
Lead Scientist
Great Ape Trust of Iowa

Postdoctural Associate:
Yasuo Nagasaka
University of Iowa

LEARNING AND COGNITION: SAME-DIFFERENT CONCEPTUALIZATION AND CROSS-MODAL MATCHING

OVERVIEW

Do humans and animals differ because only humans are capable of abstract conceptual thought? This question has intrigued philosophers, biologists, and psychologist for centuries. We will explore this issue in the realm of same-different discrimination and generalization – the most frequently studied form of abstract conceptualization. Specifically, we will see whether bonobos can learn a same-different concept and whether the nature of that concept resembles that of human beings. We will also see whether bonobos with language competence differ in their conceptual behavior from bonobos without language competence; many theorists have speculated that language is at the root of differences between human and animal cognition. We will also explore the possibility that bonobos can master relational matching-to-sample, an advanced concept learning task which captures the essence of analogy, in which logical arguments are given visually. According to many theorists, human reasoning and intelligence are grounded on analogical thinking; so, it is vital to see whether this brand of cognition too is uniquely human. Finally, we will pursue same-different conceptualization in the context of cross-modal matching. Humans live in a highly complex environment, in which we must integrate vast amounts of varied information across different sensory modalities. In that world, we frequently have multiple signs for the same significate; we also have multiple significates for the same sign. Such a rich representational structure raises the possibility that signs might not only be functionally equivalent to significates, but that signs might be functionally equivalent to one another. We do not yet know whether apes need special training to integrate information that is input from their visual and tactual senses. We suspect that these sensory modes will be readily integrated in all bonobos and that language experience might hasten the speed of integration even further. We hope to find out in a series of cross-modal matching experiments with language-experienced and language-inexperienced bonobos.

Performance Sites:
» Great Ape Trust of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa

RELATED PUBLICATIONS
» Culture Prefigures Cognition in Pan/Homo Bonobos
» Cultural Apprenticeship: Social Processes In The Ontogeny of Object Use in Pan paniscus
» Behavioral and Neuroanotomical Asymmetries In Bonobos, Pan paniscus
» Development of Language, Gesture and Play In Bonobos
» Comparative Analysis of Orangutan and Bonobo Numerical Competence
» Basic Memory Processes In Bonobos
» Conversational Vocal Exchanges Among Bonobos
» Multimodal Analysis of Communicative Behavior In Bonobos
» Investigations of Skill Acquisition and Site Formation Processes with Groups of Stone-tool Making Apes
» Music Perception, Learning, and Production In Apes
» Learning and Cognition Same Different Conceptualization and Cross Modal Matching